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FIRST AND FOURTH AMENDMENTS-
OBSCENITY AND POLICE
PURCHASES: A PURCHASE IS A
PURCHASE IS A SEIZURE?
Maryland v. Macon, 105 S. Ct. 2778 (1985).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Maryland v. Macon,' the United States Supreme Court held
that an undercover police officer's entry into a bookstore and even-
tual purchase of two allegedly obscene magazines did not constitute
a search or seizure under the fourth amendment. 2 The Court's view
of the transaction as a simple purchase, instead of a seizure, appears
to be supported by its precedents in the areas of first amendment
obscenity3 and fourth amendment search and seizure.4 Moreover,
the Court's decision is both practical and logical.5
The Court's decision treats the transaction as what it plainly ap-
pears to be-a simple purchase, 6 it facilitates the police depart-
ment's enforcement of the obscenity statute 7 and it furthers the
public interest.8 This casenote analyzes the transaction to deter-
mine if it is truly a purchase, and not a seizure, and concludes that
the Court correctly characterized it as a purchase.
1 105 S. Ct. 2778 (1985).
2 Id. at 2783.
3 The first amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4 The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
5 See infra notes 105-84 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 105-70 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.




Respondent, Baxter Macon, was convicted in Prince George's
County, Maryland, of distributing obscene materials in violation of
article 27, section 418 of the Maryland Code.9 The Maryland Court
of Special Appeals reversed the conviction on the ground that the
magazines were improperly admitted into evidence.' 0 The Mary-
land Supreme Court denied certiorari. 1 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari' 2 to decide "whether a purchase
of allegedly obscene matter by an undercover police officer consti-
tutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment."'
13
On May 6, 1981, three Prince George's County police detec-
tives went to the Silver News, Inc., an adult bookstore, as part of a
police investigation of adult bookstores in the area.' 4 One of the
detectives, who was not in uniform, entered the store, browsed for
several minutes and purchased two magazines from Baxter Macon,
with a marked $50 bill. 1-5 The detective left the store and showed
the magazines to his fellow officers. 16 Together they concluded that
the two magazines were obscene.' 7 The detectives then returned to
the store, arrested Macon and retrieved the $50 bill that had been
used to purchase the magazines, but failed to return the change.'
8
Prior to trial, Macon moved to suppress the purchased
magazines and the $50 bill.' 9 The trial judge denied the motion.
20
9 The statue provides:
Any person who knowingly sends or causes to be sent, or brings or causes to be
brought, into this State for sale or distribution, or in this State prepares, publishes,
prints, exhibits, distributes, or offers to distribute, or has in his possession with
intent to distribute or to exhibit or offer to distribute, any obscene matter is guilty
of a misdemeanor.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 418 (1982). The legislative purpose of § 418 is to deter the
dissemination of obscene materials by making designated acts a crime. See Wheeler v.
State, 281 Md. 593, 380 A.2d 1052 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 997 (1978).
10 Macon v. State, 57 Md. App. 785, 471 A.2d 1090 (1984).
11 State v. Macon, 300 Md. 795, 481 A.2d 240 (1984).
12 Maryland v. Macon, 105 S. Ct. 900 (1985).
13 Maryland v. Macon, 105 S. Ct. 2778 at 2780.
14 Id.
15 Id. Both magazines that were purchased were enclosed in clear plastic wrappers.
The total cost of the two magazines was $12. Macon, 57 Md. App. at 708, 471 A.2d at
1091.
16 Macon, 105 S. Ct. at 2780.
17 Id. The officers reached this obscenity determination under the criteria previously
used by them in warrant applications. Id.
18 Id. The detectives did not return the change received at the time of the purchase.
Id. Macon escorted the remaining customers out and closed the bookstore before leav-
ing with the detectives. Id.
'9 Id.
20 Id. The motion was denied on the grounds that the purchase was not a seizure
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At trial, the magazines, but not the $50 bill, were introduced into
evidence. 21 The jury found Macon guilty of distributing obscene
materials.
22
Macon appealed, contending that a prior judicial determination
of probable cause was required to sustain a seizure of the magazines
and to arrest him on obscenity related charges. 23 The Maryland
Court of Special Appeals determined that the purchase of the
magazines was a constructive seizure in contravention of fourth
amendment protections, and that the proper remedy was to exclude
the magazines from evidence at trial.24 The court also held, in the
alternative, that the warrantless arrest of Macon required the exclu-
sion of the publications from evidence.25 Accordingly, the court re-
versed the conviction and ordered that the charges against Macon
be dismissed, because without the magazines there was insufficient
evidence to sustain the conviction.
26
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals began its analysis by
stating: "The need to protect first amendment rights from govern-
ment suppression necessitates more stringent application of fourth
amendment safeguards in obscenity cases than in criminal cases.
' '27
The court recognized that the warrant requirement is primary
among these safeguards because the protection of first amendment
freedoms cannot be relegated to the whim of a law enforcement of-




23 Id. Macon did not challenge the jury's finding that the magazines were obscene.
Id. at 2780-81.
24 Macon, 57 Md. App. at 717-19, 471 A.2d at 1096. The Supreme Court noted that
by holding that the purchase constituted a seizure, the Maryland Court of Special Ap-
peals rejected the view taken by a majority of states-that a purchase by an undercover
police officer is not a seizure, regardless of whether the funds used to make the purchase
are later retrieved as evidence. Macon, 105 S. Ct. at 2781. The Court cited the following
cases: Baird v. State, 671 S.W.2d 191 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984) (en banc) (sale of obscene
periodicals); Wood v. State, 144 Ga. App. 236, 240 S.E.2d 743 (1977), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 899 (1978) (sale of obscene magazines); People v. Ridens, 51 Ill. 2d 410, 282
N.E.2d 691 (1972) (sale of obscene books); State v. Welke, 298 Minn. 402, 216 N.W.2d
641 (1974) (sale of obscene magazines); State v. Perry, 567 S.W.2d 380 (Mo. App. 1978)
(sale of obscene magazines); State v. Dornblaser, 26 Ohio Misc. 29, 267 N.E.2d 434
(1971) (sale of obscene films); and Cherokee News and Arcade, Inc. v. State, 533 P.2d
624 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974) (sale of obscene materials). Macon, 105 S. Ct. at 2781. The
Court also cited a case which holds to the contrary: State v. Furuyama, 64 Haw. 109,
637 P.2d 1095 (1981) (sale of pornographic publications). Macon, 105 S. Ct. at 2781.
25 Macon, 57 Md. App. at 719, 471 A.2d at 1097.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 710, 471 A.2d at 1092 (citing Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564-
65 (1978); W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 6.7(e) (1978); 50 AM. JUR. 2D Lewdness, Indecency, and Obscenity, § 12 (1970)).
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ficer.28 The court concluded: "Thus, consideration of first amend-
ment rights necessitates obtention of a judicial warrant as a
precondition to seizure of allegedly obscene materials. '29 The
Maryland Court of Special Appeals then stated that similar reason-
ing applied to the seizure of a person allegedly involved in the dis-
tribution of such materials. 30 As a result, the court explained that
the prerequisite to a seizure of the person, as well as the allegedly
obscene matter he distributes, is a prior judicial probable cause de-
termination that the matter is obscene.
3 '
The court then addressed the state's contention that the
magazines were purchased, and not seized.32 The court stated that
viewing the occurrence as a purchase would unjustifiedly circumvent
first amendment protections.3 3 It explained: "To permit the police,
28 Macon, 57 Md. App. at 711, 471 A.2d at 1093 (citing Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S.
496 (1973)). The Court also stated:
The complexity of the test for obscenity, and the need to ensure that constitution-
ally protected speech is not discouraged, require that the probable cause determina-
tion of obscenity be entrusted not to the police officer, who may lack legal expertise
or impartiality, but to the judicial officer, whose knowledge of the law, coupled with
his neutrality and detachment, qualify him to make such a decision.
Id. at 718, 471 A.2d at 1092-93.
29 Macon, 57 Md. App. at 712, 471 A.2d at 1093. However, the court noted:
The Court established one exception to the warrant requirement, when police
are faced with a "now or never" situation in which they must seize the allegedly
obscene material or its distributor instantly or lose the opportunity .... There is
nothing in the record to indicate that [Macon] or the magazines would not have
been subject to seizure after the time required to have a neutral magistrate review
the material and make a probable cause determination of obscenity.
The hearing to obtain a warrant need only be exparte, not adversarial.... [The
Supreme Court] did not perceive that an adversary hearing would protect first
amendment rights significantly better than an exparte proceeding.... For the same
reasoning, an adversarial hearing is not a necessary precondition to issuance of a
warrant to arrest the alleged purveyors of obscene material .... An exparte hearing
will suffice.
Id. at 712-13 n.2, 471 A.2d at 1093-94 n.2.
30 Id. at 713, 471 A.2d at 1094.
31 Id. at 713-14, 471 A.2d at 1094. The Court quoted the holding in State v.
Furuyama, 64 Haw. 109, 637 P.2d 1095 (1981): "[A] a police officer may not effect a
warrantless arrest in a setting where first amendment freedoms are implicated." Macon,
57 Md. App. at 714, 471 A.2d at 1094 (quoting Furuyama, 64 Haw. at 117, 637 P.2d at
1100).
32 Macon, 57 Md. App. at 714-15, 471 A.2d at 1095.
33 Id. The court explained:
A review of the record convinces us that every aspect of the missions in search of
pornography and its purveyors was prearranged, including the repossession of the
money given in 'payment' for the evidence. Yet, an element essential to the validity
of the seizures, judicial concurrence regarding the obscene nature of the evidence,
was missing. And the failure to seek the judge's opinion ... could not have been
inadvertent. Viewing the transactions in their entirety, we also believe they were
'preconceived seizures,' designed in part to evade that phase of the warrant proce-
dure whose specific purpose is the protection of first amendment freedoms.
What is particularly objectionable here is that the alleged purchase ... was
immediately followed by a warrantless arrest and the seizure of the money .... Such
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as a rule, to follow the practice used in this case would elevate form
over substance, effectively sanctioning an 'end run' around these
safeguards."
3 4
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that the proper
remedy for the warrantless seizure was to exclude the magazines
from trial.3 5 The court recognized that warrantless arrests do not
bar prosecution.36 The court also stated that the general rule, which
is almost unanimously followed in state and federal courts, is that an
illegal arrest does not negate subsequent conviction.
3 7
The court explained, alternatively, that Macon's unconstitu-
tional arrest furnished an additional basis for excluding the
magazines.3 8 It recognized that the first amendment prohibits the
suppression of free expression even when published materials are
not seized in violation of the fourth amendment.3 9 Because the
arrest forced Macon to close the bookstore, it was substantially
more repressive than the simple seizure of the two magazines, for it
barred public access as effectively as a seizure of all the store's publi-
cations.40 Hence, the court held that where "law enforcement of-
ficers arrest a suspected distributor of obscene matter without a
warrant authorizing seizure of either the distributor or the matter,
the proper remedy is to exclude evidence of the allegedly obscene
matter acquired in connection with the arrest."
4 1
a transaction, in our opinion, could not have been a purchase; there was no intent to
part with the money as in an ordinary sale.... [It] was tantamount to a warrantless
seizure .... [F]irst amendment considerations militate against the approval of
transactions expressly designed to evade specific warrant requirements governing
the seizure of material arguably subject to constitutional protection.... An aspect
of the warrant procedure tailored to protect first amendment freedoms could not
have been meant for easy evasion with the modicum of ingenuity.
Id. at 715-16, 471 A.2d at 1095 (quotingFuruyama, 64 Haw. at 118-19, 637 P.2d at 1181-
82).
34 Id. at 716, 471 A.2d at 1096.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 717, 471 A.2d at 1096.
37 Id. (citing United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980)).
38 Id.
39 Id. "[A] retailor or distributor of presumptively protected material must be af-
forded greater procedural safeguards before a seizure or 'constructive seizure' may take
place." Id. at 718,471 A.2d at 1096 (quoting Penthouse International, Ltd. v. McAuliffe,
610 F.2d 1353, 1359 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973))).
40 Id., 471 A.2d at 1097. The court explained that the arrest thus "brought to an
abrupt halt an orderly and presumptively legitimate distribution or exhibition .... Such
precipitate action by a police officer, without the authority of a constitutionally sufficient
warrant, is plainly a form of prior restraint and is, in those circumstances, unreasonable
under Fourth Amendment standards." Id. (quoting Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496,
504 (1973)).
41 Id. the court stated in a caveat: "The holding is this case is limited to First
Amendment rights and is not to be construed as a modification of traditional Fourth
Amendment rulings." Id. at 719 n.3, 471 A.2d at 1097 n.3.
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The Maryland Court of Special Appeals concluded that the
magazines taken from the bookstore should have been excluded
from trial. Without the magazines there was insufficient evidence to
convict Macon and thus, his conviction was reversed and the charges
dismissed.
42
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
In a seven to two decision, the Supreme Court reversed the de-
cision of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. 43 With Justice
O'Connor writing for the majority,44 the Court held that the Mary-
land Court of Special Appeals erred in viewing the purchase of the
two allegedly obscene magazines as a "constructive seizure" and in
deciding that the magazines should not have been admitted into evi-
dence at trial.45 The Court held that because the officers did not
obtain possession of the magazines by means of an unreasonable
search or seizure, and because the magazines were not the fruit of
an arrest, lawful or otherwise, the magazines were properly admit-
ted into evidence at trial.
46
The issue the majority addressed was whether a purchase of al-
legedly obscene matter by an undercover police officer constitutes a
seizure under the fourth amendment.
47
The Court then set forth a test to analyze this case. Justice
O'Connor stated that "[if] the publications were obtained by means
of an unreasonable search or seizure, or were fruits of an unlawful
arrest, the Fourth Amendment requires their exclusion from evi-
dence. If, however, the evidence is not traceable to any Fourth
42 Id. at 719, 471 A.2d at 1097.
43 Maryland v. Macon, 105 S. Ct. 2783 (1985).
44 Id. at 2780. (Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens).
45 Macon, 105 S. Ct. at 2781.
46 Id. at 2783. The Court noted: "We do not decide whether a warrant is required to
arrest a suspect on obscenity-related charges, because the magazines at issue were not
the product ofa warrantless arrest." Id. at 2781. "We leave to another day the question
whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits a warrantless arrest for the state law misde-
meanor of distribution of obscene materials." Id. at 2783.
47 Id. at 2788. The Court's reformulation of the issue to the instant case is as follows:
"[Wihether allegedly obscene magazines purchased by undercover police officers
shortly before the warrantless arrest of a sales clerk must be excluded from evidence at
the clerk's subsequent trial for distribution of obscene materials." Id. Note the narrow-
ness of the Court's inquiry: "Because we hold the magazines were properly admitted in
evidence at trial, we also do not address respondent's contention that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause bars retrial." Id. at 2781. See supra note 47.
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Amendment violation, exclusion is unwarranted." 48
The Court analyzed the first prong of its test by determining
whether the purchase constituted a search or seizure. First, the
Court explained that a search occurs when "'an expectation of pri-
vacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.' 49
The Court relied on Katz v. United States,50 in which it held that
"[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public.., is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection." 51 The Court recognized that
Macon did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in the
bookstore because the general public was invited to enter and to
transact business therein. 52 The majority concluded: "The officer's
action in entering the bookstore and examining the wares that were
intentionally exposed to all who frequent the place of business did
not infringe a legitimate expectation of privacy and hence did not
constitute a search .. .
Second, the Court explained that a seizure occurs when" 'there
is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory in-
terests' in the property seizured. ' 54 The Court noted that Macon
voluntarily transferred any possessory interest he may have had in
the magazines to the police officer upon the receipt of the purchase
money. 55 The Court concluded that at the time of the sale, the po-
lice officer did not interfere with any interest of the seller; he merely
took that which was intended as a requisite part of the transaction.
56
48 Macon, 105 S. Ct. at 2781 (citing United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 472
(1980)). The majority initially established that "[a]bsent some action taken by govern-
ment agents that can properly be classified as a 'search' or 'seizure,' the Fourth Amend-
ment rules designed to safeguard First Amendment freedoms do not apply." Id. at
2782.
49 Id. (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 189, 113 (1984)).
50 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
51 Id. at 351. The Court in Macon furthered explained: "The mere expectation that
the possibly illegal nature of a product will not come to the attention of the authorities,
whether because a customer will not complain or because undercover officers will not
transact business with the store, is not one that society is prepared to recognize as rea-
sonable." Macon, 105 S. Ct. at 2782.
52 Macon, 105 S. Ct. at 2782.
53 Id.
54 Id. (quoting United States v.Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 189, 113 (1984)).
55 Id. The Court further noted that whatever possessory interests Macon had was not
in the magazines, but in the purchase money. Id.
56 Id. The Court also dismissed any assertion that the use of undercover officers is a
per se violation of the first or fourth amendments. Id. at 2782-83. First, the Fourth
Amendment is not violated when an undercover officer merely accepts an offer to do
business which is freely made to the public. See id. at 2782. The Court said: "'A gov-
ernment agent, in the same manner as a private person, may accept an invitation to do
business and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the
occupant.'" Id. at 2782-83 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966)).
Second, the purchase by an undercover officer of a small number of magazines does not
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The Court then addressed the respondent's contention that the
bona fide nature of the purchase was invalidated due to the officer's
subsequent seizure of the marked $50 bill and failure to return the
change. 57 The Court answered that from an objective perspective,
the transaction was a sale.58 It stated: "Whether a Fourth Amend-
ment violation has occurred 'turns on an objective assessment of the
officer's actions' . . . and not on the officer's actual state of mind at
the time the challenged action was taken."5 9
The Court in Macon therefore held that the actions of the police
officer leading up to the transaction, and the actual transaction it-
self, were not a search or seizure.60 As a result, the magazines did
not have to be excluded from evidence at trial on the basis of an
unreasonable search or seizure violation.
The Court then analyzed the second prong of its test to deter-
mine whether the magazines were the fruit of an unlawful arrest. 6'
Relying on the exclusionary rule, the Court held that the " 'rule en-
joins the Government from benefiting from evidence it has unlaw-
fully obtained; it does not reach backward to taint information that
was in official hands prior to any illegality.' "62 The Court con-
cluded that the magazines were already in police possession before
the arrest, and thus were not fruits of the arrest and not subject to
render the purchase invalid under the fourth amendment. See id. at 2783. Such a
purchase is not a wholesale search or seizure. The risk of prior restraint is not impli-
cated, and the purchase is "analogous to purchases of other unlawful substances previ-
ously found not to violate the Fourth Amendment." Id. (citing Lewis v. United States,
385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966) (purchase of narcotics)).
57 Id. at 2783. The respondent argued that the purchase is "tantamount to a war-
rantless seizure" where the officer subjectively intends to seize the money while retain-
ing the magazines. Id.
58 Id. The Court explained: "The sale is not retrospectively transformed into a war-
rantless seizure by virtue of the officer's subjective intent to retrieve the purchase money
to use as evidence." Id.
59 Id. (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978)). The Court, in dicta,
furthered explained: "Assuming, arguendo, that the retrieval of the money incident to
the arrest was wrongful, the proper remedy is restitution or suppression of the $50 bill
as evidence of the purchase, not exclusion from evidence of the previously purchased
magazines." Id.
60 Id. The Court stated its conclusion as follows: "[W]e conclude that the officer's
entry into the bookstore and later examination of materials offered for sale there was not
a search and that the purchase of two magazines did not effect a seizure." Id. at 2781.
61 See id. at 2783. The Court stated the question as follows: "[W]hether respondent's
warrantless arrest after the purchase of the magazines requires their exclusion at trial."
Id.
62 Id. (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 475 (1980)). The Court, in
dicta, further explained: "[A]ssuming, arguendo, that the warrantless arrest was an un-
reasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment-a question we do not de-
cide-it yielded nothing of evidentiary value that was not already in the possession of
the police." Id.
882 [Vol. 76
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the exclusionary rule.63 In addition, the Court stated that the $50
bill, which was used to buy the obscene magazines, was the only
fruit of the arrest.6 Exercise of the exclusionary rule was not neces-
sary because the $50 bill was not introduced into evidence.
6 5
The Macon Court stated that it was reversing the judgment of
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals "[b]ecause the undercover
agents did not obtain possession of the allegedly obscene magazines
by means of an unreasonable search or seizure and [because] the
magazines were not the fruit of an arrest, lawful or otherwise " .... 66




In his dissenting opinion,68 Justice Brennan took issue with the
majority opinion in two respects. First, Justice Brennan viewed the
statute6 9 under which the respondent was convicted as "unconstitu-
tionally overbroad and therefore facially invalid in its entirety.
70
Second, Justice Brennan contended that even if he thought other-
wise regarding the constitutionality of the statute, he would not join
the majority opinion because he disagreed with the Court's analysis
of whether the respondent's warrantless arrest should result in a re-
versal of his conviction.
71






68 Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice MarshalljoinedJustice Brennan's dissent. Id.
69 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 418 (1982).
70 Macon, 105 S. Ct. at 2784 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan referred to his
dissent in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) to support his conten-
tion. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Paris Adult Theatre, Justice Brennan noted the "se-
vere problems arising from the lack of fair notice, from the chill on protected
expression, and from the stress imposed on the state and federal judicial machinery"
posed by the obscenity issue. Paris Adult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 93. He thus concluded:
In short, while I cannot say that the interests of the State... are trivial or nonexis-
tent, I am compelled to conclude that these interests cannot justify the substantial
damage to constitutional rights and to this Nation's judicial machinery that inevita-
bly results from state efforts to bar the distribution even of unprotected material to
consenting adults. . . . I would hold, therefore . . . the First and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly
to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene' con-
tents. Nothing in this approach precludes those governments from taking action to
serve what might be strong and legitimate interests through regulation of the man-
ner of distribution of sexually oriented material.
Id. at 112-13.
71 See Macon, 105 S. Ct. at 2784 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tance of the first amendment and liberty of expression. He stated
that "in enforcing the Fourth Amendment's command, courts must
exercise a 'scrupulous exactitude' to ensure that official use of the
power to search and seize poses no threat to liberty of expres-
sion." 72 He continued by explaining that a seizure of presumptively
protected books is not reasonable within the meaning of the fourth
amendment without first obtaining a judicially issued warrant. 73
Justice Brennan then contended that it logically follows that the
seizure of a person for allegedly distributing allegedly obscene
books and magazines must also meet the judicially issued warrant
requirement.74 He argued that if the investigative practice followed
in this case were permitted, it would "threaten to restrain the liberty
of expression in the same way that seizure of presumptively pro-
tected material does."'75 Justice Brennan noted "the disruptive po-
tential of an effectively unbound power to arrest,"76 and stated that
Roaden v. Kentucky makes clear that government officials may not
seize persons or books and magazines without some prior judicial
determination of probable cause.77 Justice Brennan concluded that
the warrantless arrest in this case was "clearly illegal."78
Justice Brennan also argued that the Court left the respondent
"without an effective remedy for his illegal arrest." 79 He noted that
the Court followed precedents which hold that "the illegality of an
arrest in itself will not suffice to prevent the introduction of evi-
dence lawfully obtained prior to arrest,8 0 ... or to invalidate a con-
72 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965)).
73 See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated:
An official seizure of presumptively protected books [and] magazines ... is not
'reasonable' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment unless a neutral and
detached magistrate has issued a warrant particularly describing the things to be
seized, and the probable-cause determination supporting the warrant is based on a
proceeding in which the magistrate has the opportunity to 'focus searchingly on the
question of obscenity.'"
Id. (quoting Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961)) (citation omitted).
74 See id. at 2785 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan maintained: "A warrant-
less arrest involves the same risks as does a warrantless seizure of books [or]
magazines." Id.
75 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan illustrated this disruptive potential
by stating that in the instant case, the police officer's conduct "brought to an abrupt halt
an orderly and presumptively legitimate distribution or exhibition." Id. (quoting
Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1972)).
77 See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1972)).
78 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 472-73
(1980)).
884 [Vol. 76
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viction." 8' Justice Brennan contended that when first amendment
values are at stake, it is inappropriate to apply these precedents
mechanically.8 2 Instead, one must balance "the state's interest in
law enforcement" against "the citizen's interest in protection from
unreasonable official overreaching. 83 Justice Brennan stated this
balancing method:
In most cases the incremental deterrent of invalidating a conviction as
a result of an illegal arrest might not justify the added 'interference
with the public interest in having the guilty brought to book.' United
States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966). In cases like the present one,
however, an additional and countervailing public interest in ensuring
the broad exercise of First Amendment freedoms must enter the
calculus.
8 4
Justice Brennan concluded that the deterrent to protected ex-
pression which would result from such a system demands an effec-
tive remedy.8 5 The remedy posited by Justice Brennan was the
invalidation of obscenity convictions which are founded upon ar-
rests unsupported by any prior judicial determination of probable
cause.8 6
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES AND DOCTRINE
The importance of the fourth amendment cannot be underesti-
mated.8 7 It is primarily through the fourth amendment that we as a
society can govern our police, instead of our police governing us.88
81 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474
(1980)).
82 See id. at 2786 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan explained in detail:
[T]he consequences of illegal use of the power of arrest fall not only upon the spe-
cific victims of abuse of that power but also upon all those who, for fear of being
subjected to official harrassment, steer far wider of the forbidden zone than they
otherwise would. Such a result would infringe not only the rights of those who
would otherwise engage in such expression but also the rights of those who would
otherwise receive such expression.
Id.
85 See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86 See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan declared: "Opting for the con-
trary course, the Court today sanctions an end around constitutional requirements care-
fully crafted to guard our liberty of expression." Id.
87 As Anthony G. Amsterdam, Professor of Law at New York University School of
Law, states: "I can think of few constitutional issues more important than defining the
reach of the fourth amendment-the extent to which it controls the array of activities of
the police... [and] the amount of power that [society] permits its police to use without
effective control by law." Amsterdam, Perspective on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 377 (1974).
88 See id. at 380. Professor Amsterdam stated:
[W]e must count upon the Constitution, and primarily upon the fourth amendment,
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As such, it is a "profoundly antigovernment document."8 9 "A para-
mount purpose of the fourth amendment is to prohibit arbitrary
searches and seizures as well as unjustified searches and seizures." 90
The framers of the Bill of Rights drafted the fourth amendment
primarily to secure people from searches and seizures by officers
acting with the unrestricted authority of a general warrant. 91 These
general warrants placed "'the liberty of every man in the hands of
every petty officer.' "92
While the fourth amendment was most directly the product of
contemporary hatred against a system of writs of assistance, its roots
go much deeper.93 While occasionally specific, the warrants which
were utilized more often than not gave the most general discretion-
ary authority. 94 As a result, general warrants were ultimately judi-
cially condemned in England. 95 This history is a component of the
intellectual matrix within which the Bill of Rights' fabric was
shaped. 9
6
to identify the areas of concern, keep the concerns alive, set at least the minimum
standards for each area, and provoke, inform and monitor the processes of enforce-
ment in each area where we want to govern our police instead of being governed by
them.
Id.
89 Id. at 353. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). The Supreme
Court declared: "The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches
and seizures, and ... its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and his-
tory clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign au-
thority ...." Id.
90 Amsterdam, supra note 87, at 417. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 480-81
(1964); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732-33 (1961).
91 See Stanford, 379 U.S. at 480-85. The Court described the attitude of that era as
follows:
Vivid in the memory of the newly independent Americans were those general war-
rants known as writs of assistance under which officers of the Crown had so bedev-
iled the colonists. The hated writs of assistance had given customs officials blanket
authority to search where they pleased .... They were denounced by James Otis as




93 See id. at 482. These roots were based upon the "use of general warrants as instru-
ments of oppression from the time of the Tudors, through the Star Chamber, the Long
Parliament, the Restoration, and beyond." Id.
94 See Marcus, 367 U.S. at 726.
95 See id. at 728. Entich v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765), which led to this
condemnation of general warrants, has been called "one of the landmarks of English
liberty." Marcus, 367 U.S. at 728 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626
(1886)).
96 See Marcus, 367 U.S. at 729. The Court emphasized:
The Bill of Rights was fashioned against the background of knowledge that un-
restricted power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for stifling lib-
erty of expression. For the serious hazard of suppression of innocent expression
inhered in the discretion confided in the officers authorized to exercise the power.
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Current fourth amendment doctrines are based on the principle
that searches and seizures are forbidden by the fourth amendment
only if they are unreasonable. 97 In 1950, the Supreme Court took a
broad view of the phrase unreasonable searches and seizures; how-
ever, during the past twenty years, the Court has uniformly con-
demned searches and seizures made without a search warrant,
subject only to a few narrow exceptions.98 Search warrants may be
issued only by judicial officers, upon a showing of probable cause;
that is, "reasonable grounds to believe-that criminally related ob-
jects are in the place which the warrant authorizes to be searched
and the items or matters to be seized." 99 An -officer may not seize
anything that is not described in the search warrant except contra-
band and perhaps other obvious criminal objects which he in-
advertantly encounters in plain view. 100 Exceptions to the warrant
requirement include 1) consent searches, 2) a very limited class of
routine searches, and 3) certain searches conducted under circum-
stances of haste which make it impracticable to obtain a search war-
rant.' 0 ' When first amendment rights are implicated, the
constitutional requirement "that warrants must particularly describe
the 'things to be seized' is to be accorded the most scrupulous exact-
itude."' 10 2 The Court in Marcus v. Search Warrant 10 3 elaborated:
Id.
With respect to the importance of the fourth amendment's historical background, Pro-
fessor Amsterdam stated:
The pre-constitutional history... is concerned with the abuses of search warrants,
not warrantless searches-a contrast that has led Telford Taylor to observe that
"[flrom a historical standpoint, [the justices] ... have stood the fourth amendment
on its head." Whether Professor Taylor's observation is an indictment or an acco-
lade depends largely upon the answer to the ... question.., what [is] the extent to
which the fourth amendment should be restricted to its historical origins.
Amsterdam, supra note 87, at 367. Professor Amsterdam continued by commenting on
Justice Frankfurter's perspective of the fourth amendment. He stated: "Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, who more than any other of the Justices sought the fourth amendment's
meaning in its history, found there no limitation of its sweeping terms searches and
seizures.'" Id. at 397. Professor Amsterdam concluded:
Indisputably the "searches and seizures" on the agenda at the time the fourth
amendment was written were the rummagings of the English messengers and colo-
nial customs officers. We can reconstruct with some fair confidence what "the fram-
ers" thought of those. It is illusory to suppose that we can know what they thought
of anything else. Nothing else was then in controversy.
Id. at 398.





102 Stanford, 379 U.S. at 485.
103 367 U.S. 717 (1960). See also 50 AM. JUR. 2D Lewdness, Indecency and Obscenity § 12
(1970). "Within the precinct of the First Amendment, the requirement that a search
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[T]he line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech
which may be regulated, suppressed, or punished is finely drawn....
The separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for.., sen-
sitive tools .... It follows that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a
State is not free to adopt whatever procedures it pleases for dealing
with obscenity.., without regard to possible consequences for consti-
tutionally protected speech.1
0 4
However, notwithstanding these well-established fourth amendment
principles and precedents, if police activities are not searches or
seizures, the fourth amendment proscriptions do not apply.'0 5
V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
In holding that a purchase of allegedly obscene magazines by
an undercover police officer does not constitute a seizure under the
fourth amendment, the Supreme Court in Macon reached a decision
which is supported by precedents in the areas of both first amend-
ment obscenity and fourth amendment search and seizure. Indeed,
the Court's view of the purchase as simply that-a purchase- is rea-
sonable and logical.10 6 It avoided the impracticable result of requir-
ing a police officer to obtain a warrant before he can make a simple
purchase.
Initially, it is important to note the narrowness of the Court's
inquiry. The Court focused on the police officer's actions in the
bookstore leading up to the purchase of the two magazines and the
actual purchase of the magazines.' 0 7 It did not consider whether the
fourth amendment prohibited the subsequent warrantless arrest,
leaving that question open, because the magazines at issue were not
the product of the warrantless arrest.'0 8
With respect to the scope of the term "search," courts have rec-
warrant be obtained prior to any search or seizure assures a free society that the sensi-
tive determination of obscenity will be made judicially and not ad hoc by police officers
in the field." Id.
104 Marcus, 367 U.S. at 736.
105 See United States v. Dionisio, 418 U.S. 1, 15 (1973). Professor Amsterdam de-
scribed this fourth amendment applicability-nonapplicability framework as follows:
The fourth amendment, then, is ordinarily treated as a monolith: wherever it re-
stricts police activities at all, it subjects them to the same extensive retrictions that it
imposes upon physical entries into dwellings. To label any police activity a
"search" or "seizure" within the ambit of the amendment is to impose those restric-
tions upon it. On the other hand, if it is not labeled a "search" or "seizure," it is
subject to no restrictions of any kind. It is only "searches" or "seizures" that the
fourth amendment requires to be reasonable: police activities of any other sort may
be as unreasonable as the police please to make them.
Amsterdam, supra note 87, at 388.
106 See supra notes 107-84 and accompanying text.
107 See supra notes 47-48.
108 See supra notes 47-48.
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ognized that not all quests for evidence are searches within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. 10 9 Instead, as the Court in Katz
v. United States 110 explained, the formula of fourth amendment cov-
erage is that whenever an individual may have a reasonable expecta-
don of privacy, he is entitled to be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion."' The term "expectation of privacy" was
defined by Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Katz. He stated that
"there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' "112
109 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.5 (1967). See also State v. Furuyama,
64 Haw. 109, 118, 637 P.2d 1095, 1101 (1981). The Supreme Court of Hawaii stated:
"We further realize 'implications of a search are inherent in any quest for evidence by
the police, [but] no one has ever suggested that every instance of such seeking is a
'search'.'" Id. (quoting W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 2.1 at 223 (1978)).
110 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
111 See id. at 351-52. Professor Amsterdam pointed out that " 'Searches' are not par-
ticular methods by which government invades constitutionally protected interests: they
are a description of the conclusion that such interests have been invaded." Amsterdam,
supra note 87, at 385. Professor Amsterdam also noted: "In the end, the basis of the
Katz decision seems to be that the fourth amendment protects those interests that may
justifiably claim fourth amendment protection." Id.
112 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan,J., concurring). Justice Harlan's elaboration of what
he understood the majority's opinion to mean is set forth:
As the Court's opinion states, "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places." The question, however, is what protection it affords to those people....
My understanding of the rule... is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus,
a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects,
activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of outsiders are not
"protected" because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On
the other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being
overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be
unreasonable.
Id. Professor Amsterdam took issue with the subjective aspect of the test. He urged:
An actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in a statement of
what Katz held or in a theory of what the fourth amendment protects. It can neither
add to, nor can its absence detract from, an individual's claim to fourth amendment
protection. If it could, the government could diminish each person's subjective ex-
pectation of privacy merely by announcing half-hourly on television that 1984 was
being advanced by a decade and that we were all forthwith being placed under com-
prehensive electronic surveillance.
Amsterdam, supra note 87, at 384. Justice Harlan ultimately agreed with the view pos-
ited by Amsterdam. In his dissenting opinion in United States v. White, 407 U.S. 745
(1971), he counseled that analysis under Katz "must... transcend the search for subjec-
tive expectations," for " [o]ur expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part
reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and pres-
ent. Id. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In addressing the question of what expectations
of privacy are constitutionally justifiable, Professor Amsterdam emphasized:
The ultimate question.., is a value judgment. It is whether, if the particular form
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In applying the Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test 13
to business and commercial premises, many police investigative ac-
tivities may not constitute fourth amendment searches due to dimin-
ished expectations of privacy. 114 As the Court in Katz declared:
"What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion."'115 As a result, law enforcement officials may freely accept a
general public invitation to enter commercial premises; 116 and the
reasons for accepting this invitation need not be related to the trade
conducted there. 1 7
Once a police officer has entered the commercial premises in
the same manner as would any other member of the public, the of-
ficer's actions do not constitute a search if he conducts himself as
might be expected of any other person entering the premises.
118
He may examine merchandise as would a prospective customer, 119
and " 'take note of objects in plain view.'"120 However, if the of-
ficer goes beyond the limits of what a potential customer could be
expected to do, his conduct may constitute a search. 12 1 As the
Court in Lewis v. United States122 cautioned: "[T]his does not mean
that, whenever entry is obtained by invitation and the locus is char-
acterized as a place of business, an agent is authorized to conduct a
of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go unregulated by constitu-
tional restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be
diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society.
Amsterdam, supra note 87, at 403.
113 See supra notes 109- 10 and accompanying text.
114 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.4,
at 338. Professor LaFave explained:
"It is a fair generalization, however, that business and commercial premises are not
as private as residential premises, and that consequently there are various police investi-
gative procedures which may be directed at such premises without the police conduct
constituting a Fourth Amendment search." Id.
115 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
116 See W. LAFAvE, supra note 114, § 2.4, at 338 (citing United States v. Berrett, 513
F.2d 154 (1st Cir. 1975)).
117 See Id. Courts have consistently held that police officers, even though motivated by
an investigative purpose, did not conduct a search merely by entering various commer-
cial premises. See Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408 (1984) (motel); Northside
Realty Associates Inc. v. United States, 605 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1979) (real estate office);
People v. Johnson, 21 Ill. App. 3d 769, 315 N.E.2d 579 (1974) (pool hall); State v.
Russo, 470 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. App. 1971) (restaurant); Commonwealth v. Adams, 234 Pa.
Super. 475, 341 A.2d 206 (1975) (bus terminal); State v. Doukales, 11l R.I. 443, 383
A.2d 769 (1973) (variety store).
118 See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1978); Lewis v. United States, 385
U.S. 206, 211 (1966). See also LAFAvE, supra note 114, § 2.4, at 339.
119 See LAFAvE, supra note 114, § 2.4, at 339.
120 Id. (quoting United States v. Berrett, 513 F.2d 154, 156 (1st Cir. 1975)).
121 See supra note 117.
122 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
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general search for incriminating materials."' 23 Consequently, war-
rantless wholesale searches and seizures generally do not comport
with fourth amendment guarantees.'
24
When the police officer in Macon entered the bookstore,
browsed a few minutes, and finally purchased the two magazines, he
conducted himself as any reasonable customer would.' 25 He was
not conducting a wholesale search,' 26 or any type of search whatso-
ever.' 27 In sum, the police officer was not infringing on any legiti-
mate, reasonable expectation of privacy, and was therefore not
subject to any fourth amendment prohibitions.
It is important to note the distinction between a seizure and a
sale. The Court in United States v. Jacobsen '28 said that a seizure oc-
curs "when there is some meaningful interference with an individ-
ual's possessory interests" in the property seized.' 29 On the other
hand, when a bonafide sale occurs,' 30 the exchange results in a vol-
untary transfer to the purchaser of any possessory interest the seller
may have had. 131 The officer thus takes only that which is contem-
123 Id. at 211.
124 See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc., 442 U.S. at 329. In Lo-Ji Sales, Inc., police officers and a Town
Justice searched an adult bookstore during business hours. The Justice examined
magazines after the officers removed the cellophane wrappers within which they were
enclosed. Id. at 322-23. The Justice also looked at films on coin-operated projectors
after the sales clerk adjusted the projector so that no coins were required. Id. The
Court concluded that the search could not be upheld under the search warrant held by
the officers. Id. at 325-26. In addressing the state's contention that no warrant was
needed because the salesclerk had "no legitimate expectation of privacy against govern-
mental intrusion," the Court said:
[TMhere is no basis for the notion that because a retail store invites the public to
enter, it consents to wholesale searches and seizures that do not conform to Fourth
Amendment guarantees.... The Town Justice viewed the films, not as a customer,
but without the payment a member of the public would be required to make. Simi-
larly, in examining the books . . . he was not seeing them as a customer would
ordinarily seem them.
Id. at 329.
125 See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
127 See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
128 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
129 Id. at 113.
130 See State v. Flynn, 519 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. 1975). The Supreme Court of Missouri has
set out a general rule for a bona fide sale. The court stated that a sale is established
where "[tihe evidence shows that the police officer asked for a publication of a certain
type, that it was produced by [the seller], that the officer paid the purchase price, and
that the book was delivered to him." Id. at 13. In applying the general rule to the facts
of its case, the court concluded that the purchasing officer paid for and owned the
magazines, and thus that there was no seizure. Id. See State v. Perry, 567 S.W.2d 380,
382 (Mo. App. 1978).
131 See United States v. Lewis, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966). See also supra notes 55-56;
supra notes 133-41.
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plated, and in fact intended, by the seller as a necessary part of the
transaction.13 2 Hence, the Court in Macon rightly held that the
purchase of two magazines by an undercover officer was not a
seizure.
However, the respondent asserted that the entire transaction
was a preconceived seizure.1 33 The preconceived seizure theory
maintains that police officers do not actually intend to part with the
purchase money, 134 and that therefore the transaction is not a bo-
nafide purchase, but a "preconceived seizure" designed to evade
the procedural safeguard of obtaining a warrant.
135
The difficulty with the "preconceived seizure" theory is that it
delves into the subjective. 136 In contrast, an objective standard is
the test which has been selected and continuously utilized by the
Court to determine if there has been a fourth amendment viola-
tion. 1 37 As the Court in Scott v. United States '3 8 pronounced: "[I]n
evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment the Court
has.., undertaken an objective assessment of an officer's actions in
light of the facts and circumstances then known to him."' 139 Justices
White, Harlan, and Stewart strongly took issue with the subjective
132 See Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210.
133 See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
134 See Furuyama, 64 Haw. at 117-19, 637 P.2d at 1101. The theory recognizes the
fact that most of these purchases are followed by a warrantless arrest and a recovery of
the purchase money. See id.
135 See Id. In advancing this theory, the Supreme Court of Hawaii added a caveat:
"Our holding here is a narrow one which is not meant to affect the validity of purchases
by undercover agents in settings where there is no deliberate effort to evade warrant
requirements governing the seizure of arguably protected expressive material." Id. at
119 n.6.
136 See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1977); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
See also Amsterdam, supra note 87, at 373. Professor Amsterdam elaborated:
For the most part.., the constitutional rules governing searches and seizures allow,
withhold or limit the search power upon the basis of entirely objective criteria.
When objective circumstances authorizing an exercise of that power exist, a police-
man may exercise it within objectively defined limits; and courts will not ordinarily
inquire whether it exercise was actuated by the right or wrong motives.
Id.
137 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
138 436 U.S. 128 (1977).
139 Id. at 137. In Tery v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968), the Supreme Court first
noted that the fourth amendment prohibits only "unreasonable" searches and seizures,
and then emphasized the objective nature of the term "reasonable."
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured
that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be
subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circum-
stances. And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged
against an objective standard.
Id at 21.
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view, cautioning that to send "state and federal courts on an expedi-
tion into the minds of police officers would produce a grave and
fruitless misallocation of judicial resources."' 40  In sum, as the
Court in Scott maintained, "the fact that the officer does not have the
state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide
the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the
action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify
that action." 14 1 Viewed objectively, the purchase of a magazine by
an undercover officer is simply that-a purchase-regardless of any
subjective intent the officer may have entertained.142 As a result,
the transaction is not a seizure, and thus not subject to fourth
amendment proscriptions.1
43
Furthermore, the simple browsing and eventual purchase of a
few magazines in a bookstore cannot be characterized as a wholesale
search or seizure so as to subject these actions to fourth amendment
scrutiny. Permitting this conduct does not result in a risk of prior
restraint.' 44 More specifically, the purchase of a few magazines does
not harm the seller,' 45 nor does it harm potential buyers or the gen-
eral public. ' 46 The seller is not deprived of the ability to effectuate a
sale, 147 and potential buyers and the general public are not deprived
140 Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 568, 565 (1968) (White, J., dissenting from the
dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted).
141 Scott, 436 U.S. at 138.
142 See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
143 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
144 See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc., 442 U.S. at 327-28. The Court in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc., noted that the
underlying premise for the special fourth amendment protections accorded searches for
and seizures of first amendment materials is the risk of prior restraint. Id. See also Mar-
cus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
145 See Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210 (where the Court made note of the fact that an under-
cover agent did not "see, hear, or take anything that was not contemplated, and in fact
intended, by [the seller] as a necessary part of his illegal business."). In addressing the
purchase of allegedly obscene films, the Court in State v. Dornblaser, 26 Ohio Misc. 29,
267 N.E.2d 434 (1971), explained:
The Marcus and Quantity of Books cases deal with seizure of books, including both
obscene and not obscene. In our judgment the Court was rightly concerned with
denial of circulation of books that were not obscene and that the seizure of such
books deprived the owner of due process. If it were found that the books were not
obscene, the ability to effectuate a sale was gone .... In the instant case, we have
films purchased, not seized .... To seize books before they are declared obscene
and remove them from sale by the dealer could work irreparable property loss to
him, if the court held them not obscene upon a later hearing. The dealer has lost
the sale of his books or magazines, and there may be no sale for them after their
return. Where, as here, the prosecuting officers procured the magazines by purchase, the dealer
could suffer no injury, if the books are later held not to be obscene.
Id. at 33-34, 267 N.E.2d at 436-37 (quoting Peachtree News Co. v. Slaton, 226 Ga. 471,
473-74, 175 S.E.2d 539, 548 (1978)).
146 See Marcus, 367 U.S. at 736; Lo-Ji Sales, Inc., 442 U.S. at 327.
147 See supra note 145.
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of the opportunity to purchase additional copies of the same
magazines. 148 Hence, the purchase neither creates a risk of prior
restraint, nor can it be termed a wholesale search and seizure; as a
result, it is not subject to fourth amendment proscriptions.
The purchase by the undercover agent in the instant case is in-
distinguishable from the purchase of other illegal substances previ-
ously found not to violate the fourth amendment.1 49 As the Court
in Lewis noted, if such undercover activities were illegal per se, this
proscription would "severely hamper the Government in ferreting
out those organized criminal activities that are characterized by cov-
ert dealings with victims who either cannot or do not protest."' 50 In
addition, as Justice Brennan explained in his concurring opinion in
Lewis, such activity invades no right to privacy of the seller. 15 1 Con-
sequently, the activity is not a search or seizure.
The most prominent examples of these "secret" crimes include
the illegal sales of liquors, narcotics, firearms, bribery, and prostitu-
tion.' 52 These enumerated criminal categories are established
under regulatory statutes which condemn behavior directed against
public order, and not particular individuals.' 53 Violation is deemed
a wrong against society and not against a specific individual.'
54
These offenses are carried out in "secret," and it is rare for any
member of the public to be willing to assist in the enforcement of
the law.' 55 It is necessary therefore that the government rely upon
148 See supra note 146.
149 See Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210 (purchase of narcotics in the home of the seller-dealer by
an undercover agent).
150 Id. On the use of undercover agents, the Court stated:
Particularly, in the enforcement of vice, liquor of narcotics laws, it is all but impossi-
ble to obtain evidence for prosecution save by the use of decoys. There are rarely
complaining witnesses. The participants in the crime enjoy themselves. Misrepre-
sentation by a police officer or agent concerning the identity of the purchaser of
illegal narcotics is a practical necessity.
Id. at 210-11 n.6 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, comment, at 16 (Tentative Draft
No. 9, 1959)).
151 Id. at 213 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan explained:
[IT]he seller cannot, then, complaint that his privacy has been invaded so long as the
agent does no more than buy his wares....
... Mhe agent, in the same manner as any private person, entered the prem-
ises for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant and took nothing away
except what would be taken away by any willing purchaser. There was therefore no
intrusion upon the "sanctity" of [the seller's] . . . "privacies of life."
Id. See also supra notes 108-23; supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
152 See Note, Entrapment, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1333, 1338 (1960). See also Donnelly,Judi-
cial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons and Agent Provacateurs, 60 YALE LJ. 1091, 1093-
94 (1951).
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the diligence of its own officials. 156 This requires that the police
must be present at the time the offenses are committed in an under-
cover capacity or through spies.
157
The Court in Sorrells v. United States 15 8 recognized that standard
police procedures may not be adequate in these situations. The
Court stated:
Artifice and strategem may be employed to catch those engaged in
criminal enterprises.... The appropriate object of this permitted ac-
tivity, frequently essential to the enforcement of the law, is to reveal
the criminal design; to expose the illicit traffic, the prohibited publication,
the fraudulent use of the mails, the illegal conspiracy, or other offenses
159
In State v. Jarvis,160 the defendant was found guilty of selling
intoxicating liquor. The conviction was based upon the purchase of
one pint of liquor with two $1 bills by two police officers.' 6 1 Simi-
larly, in People v. Rucker,162 an undercover police officer purchased
ten dollars worth of morphine.' 63 This evidence was admissible at
trial to support the defendant's conviction. 64 Likewise, in People v.
Fiche,'6 5 an agent working for the state's attorneys' office purchased
four bombs with six $50 bills and a $240 check. 166 Subsequent to
the defendant's arrest, the marked bills were retrieved by the state's
attorney office.' 67 In all of these cases, the transactions were treated
as simple purchases and not as seizures.
Moreover, to require a police officer to obtain a warrant in or-
der to make a purchase is simply ludicrous.' 68 Such a requirement
would erect yet another procedural barrier for officers in their al-
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
159 Id. at 441-42 (emphasis added).
160 105 W. Va. 499, 143 S.E. 235 (1928).
161 Id. at 500-01, 143 S.E. at 236. For similar liquor purchase cases, see United States
v. Reisenweber, 288 F. 528 (2d Cir. 1923); Dennis v. Dennis, 68 Conn. 186, 36 A. 34
(1896); State v. Ragan, 157 Wash. 130, 288 P. 218 (1930).
162 121 Cal. App. 361, 8 P.2d 938 (1932).
163 Id. at 364, 8 P.2d at 939.
164 Id. For a similar narcotics purchase case, see United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d
888 (2d Cir. 1952).
165 343 Ill. 367, 175 N.E. 543 (1931).
166 Id. at 372, 175 N.E. at 545.
167 Id. For a similar weapons purchase case, see People v. Makovisky, 3 Cal. 2d 366,
44 P.2d 536 (1935).
168 See State v. Domblaser, 26 Ohio Misc. 29, 33-34, 267 N.E.2d 434,437 (1971). The
court noted: "To require a prior determination of obscenity vel non under the present
facts would result in the absurdity of requiring the police undercover agents to have an
adversary hearing before even making a purchase of suspected obscene material." Id.
(quoting United States v. Gower, 316 F. Supp. 1390, 1393 (D.C. 1978)).
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ready difficult duty to curb illicit conduct.1 69 A warrant should not
be required of a police officer when he makes a simple purchase,
when it is not required of any other customer. 170 This procedural
barrier would emasculate the plain meaning of the term "purchase"
as used in the decisions of courts for years.
171
Moreover, the public interest is furthered by treating the trans-
action as a purchase. 172 The permissibility of police inducement has
a significant deterrent effect.' 73 A liquor dealer, for example, is less
likely to sell below a state determined minimum price if he is aware
that the individual requesting a "bargain" may be a law enforcement
official.'
74
Furthermore, since the businesses under discussion are subject
to special public interest, as is manifested by the fact that licenses
are required to conduct them in many states, a stricter code of con-
duct and the utilization of more stringent enforcement methods,
known to and accepted by businessmen, may be justified.175
Despite the fact that there is little risk of the evidence being
destroyed by the seller in the instant case, police officers should still
not be required to obtain a warrant prior to making a simple
purchase. 176 The nature of the illegal activity, 177 the effectiveness of
strategems, 178 the deterrent effect of "spot checks,"' 79 and the spe-
cial public interest involved 80 all counsel in favor of treating the
transaction as a simple purchase rather than a seizure.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's view in Maryland v. Macon that the purchase of al-
legedly obscene material by an undercover officer is simply that-a
purchase-and not a seizure, is supported by its precedents both in
the areas of obscenity as well as search and seizure. Furthermore,
the Court's holding is both reasonable and practical. It avoids re-
quiring the acquisition of a warrant before a police officer can make
169 See Id. at 35-36, 267 N.E.2d at 438.
170 Id.
171 Cf. United States v. Gower, 316 F. Supp. 1390, 1393 (D.C. 1978).
172 Donnelly, supra note 152, at 1093.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 1094.
176 See supra notes 106-75 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 149-67 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 152-71 and accompanying text.
179 See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
180 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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a simple purchase; it enhances police enforcement techniques; and
it furthers the public interest.
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